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Antitrust-
PRIMARY JURISDICTION APPLIED IN ACTION
AGAINST MEMBERS OF REGULATED INDUSTRY
Seatrain Lines, Inc., operates special-type vessels carrying fully loaded
railroad freight cars between New York and various southern ports. The
ocean route, certificated by the ICC to Seatrain as a common carrier by
water, is a lower cost competitive alternative in many situations to ship-
ment by land over the eastern and southern railroads. Since the inception
of Seatrain's interstate service in 1932, the railroad companies and Seatrain
have been engaged in a series of controversies before the ICC.1 A primary
source of contention in these proceedings has been the Car Service and Per
Diem Agreement of the Association of American Railroads, which contains
rules and conditions for the interchange of freight cars over the nation's
railroad system. Rule Four provides:
"Cars of railway ownership must not be delivered to a steamship, ferry
or barge line for water transportation without permission of the owner
filed with the Car Service Division."
No such permission is necessary for interchange between railroads, which
by the terms of the Agreement is automatic. Rule Four admittedly was
directed solely at Seatrain, and under it many railroads have refused de-
livery of their cars to that carrier.
Complaint against this withholding of freight cars was filed with the
ICC by Seatrain as early as 1932. The railroads argued in subsequent
proceedings against both the terms upon which Seatrain wanted to enter
an interchange agreement and the authority of the Commission to compel
interchanges between rail and water carriers. In 1941 the Commission
ordered the railroads to abstain from observing and enforcing rules and
practices which prohibited the interchange of their freight cars with Sea-
train, and established certain through joint rail-water routes as well as
interchanges.2 In 1945 the Commission's power to establish through routes
and to order interchanges between rail and water carriers was affirmed by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Pennsylvania Railroad.3 However,
Seatrain's commercial operations had been halted by the war, and when
1. Five of the eighteen proceedings were appealed. For a citation of these pro-
ceedings, see 108 F. Supp. at 122, n.3 (1952).
2. 248 I.C.C. 109 (1941).
3. 323 U.S. 612 (1945). The ICC opinion apparently assumed that the Com-
mission did not have the power to order interchange of freight cars between rail
and water carriers for which a through route could not be established. The Supreme
Court opinion was somewhat ambiguous on this point. Id. at 619. See note 5
infra.
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they were resumed in 1947, Seatrain moved its port of New York terminal
from Hoboken to Edgewater and extended its operations to several southern
ports. On the theory that the Commission's order and the Supreme Court's
decision were valid only as to Hoboken and one of the southern ports, the
railroads again denied Seatrain access to freight cars under a new and
extended interpretation of Rule Four.
In 1951 Seatrain filed an antitrust complaint in a district court against
numerous eastern and southern railroads 4 and the Association alleging a
conspiracy in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the object
of which was to drive Seatrain out of business as a competitor of the de-
fendant railroads by denying it access to freight cars and by constantly
harassing it with legal and administrative actions. Both treble damages
and injunctive relief were demanded, but argument was held only on Sea-
train's motion for preliminary injunction. The district court denied the
motion and dismissed the complaint, holding that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction was fully applicable here and that consequently Seatrain must
first present the interchange issue to the ICC. Seatrain Lines,' Inc. v.
Pennsylvania Railroad, 108 F. Supp. 113 (D.N.J. 1952).5
The instant case marks another in a series of recent antitrust suits
brought by private parties against members of regulated industries.6 The
relationship between the general antitrust act and the special regulatory
statutes is not an easy one to establish, and the central problem in these
cases has been to determine which forum should make the initial decision
relating the two statutory schemes-the district court charged with en-
forcing the Sherman Act or the administrative agency authorized to
regulate the alleged violators.7 As in the instant case, the usual solu-
4. Primary defendants were the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad Company, Southern Railway Company and the Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Company.
5. Appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was docketed November
25, 1952. Petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court prior to consideration by the
Court of Appeals was filed December 11, 1952 and denied on Mar. 16, 1953, 21
U.S.L. WE K 3246.
Prior to the decision in the district court, the railroads filed a complaint with
the ICC to find "the definitive and overall solution of the many inter-related problems
in adjusting Seatrain" to the national railroad system. Docket No. 31014, March 26,
1952. Subsequent to the district court decision, Seatrain filed under § 5(b) of the
Administrative Procedure Act a petition with the ICC for a declaratory order in
which it asked a ruling on the Commission's power (1) to grant reparation for
damages resulting from abuse of legal and administrative procedures and (2) to
order railroads which do not participate in through-routes with Seatrain to inter-
change their freight cars with Seatrain. Docket No. 31177, Dec. 10, 1952. As to
the latter power, the district court interpreted the 1945 Supreme Court opinion
as holding that the ICC did have authority to compel such an interchange. On the
question of damages for abuse of process the court said this was a subsidiary charge
which necessarily followed the major charge of conspiracy to boycott as within ICC
jurisdiction. Instant case at 126, 127.
6. For a discussion of earlier cases, see Note, Judicial Application of Antitrust
Laws to Regulated Industries, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1154 (1951).
7. Decision on the actual relationship between the antitrust and regulatory
statutes has rarely been reached. See, e.g., the account of the Penn Water Litigation
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tion s has been to send the complaining party to the agency, relying on the
landmark precedent of the Abilene case 9, where the ICC was held to have
exclusive jurisdiction of a shipper's claim at law for refund of unreasonable
railroad rates, or on the more recent decision in the Far East Conference
case,'0 where the Federal Maritime Board was held to have initial juris-
diction of a government action to enjoin the dual-rate system set up
by an association of steamship companies.". The reasons given for the
result have been the need for expert interpretation of complicated industry
facts and uniform regulation of a delicately integrated national or inter-
national transportation system.
In S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Association,1 the reluctance of new
entrants into the regulated industry to rely on the administrative process for
relief against restrictive industry practices was clearly evidenced. There
a non-certificated, non-scheduled air carrier complained that the certificated,
scheduled airlines and their trade association were conspiring to monopolize
the air-borne commerce of the United States, and asked treble damages and
injunctive relief from a court under the Sherman Act. The court of
appeals, however, sent the complainant carrier to the CAB on the theory
that the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act covered the dominant facts
alleged. The court ordered the district court to retain remedial jurisdic-
tion, however, since the CAB had statutory power to grant only injunctive
relief, and not damages, against unfair methods of competition. The iden-
tical result was reached in Apgar Travel Agency v. IATA,' 3 although a
involving the FPC in 66 HRv. L. Rxv. at 160 (1952). See, however, the recent
Railway Express cases, where an exclusive agency agreement between the Railvay
Express Agency and the railroads was under attack by the Department of Justice.
In 1950, the district court in Delaware decided that where the government brings
an antitrust suit against a regulated business, the district court has plenary juris-
diction to enforce the antitrust laws, even though "administrative questions" were
involved, but because of the latter a stay on the court proceeding would be ordered
until the ICC had an opportunity to rule on the agreement. 89 F. Supp. 981. In
1951, after the ICC had approved the exclusive agency, the government again prose-
cuted its suit against Railway Express. The same court held, however, that the
ICC's approval exempted the agreement from the operation of the antitrust laws
under §5(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act and provided a substantive defense
to the government's suit. 101 F. Supp. 1008.
8. E.g., Interstate National Gas Co. v. So. Calif. Gas Co., 102 F. Supp. 685
(S.D. Calif. 1952) (antitrust complaint alleging refusal to transport gas as com-
mon carrier by pipe-line dismissed because issue within competence of FPC).
9. Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426
(1907).
10. 342 U.S. 570 (1952). Accord, U.S. Navigation Co. v. Cunard SS Co., 284
U.S. 474 (1932).
11. Whether the government or a private party brings the antitrust suit -was
held not to be a crucial factor in determining whether court or agency should take
initial action. Id. at 576. But see United States v. Railway Express Agency,
supra note 7; United States v. Inter-Island Steam Nay. Co., 87 F. Supp. 1010 (D.
Haw. 1950) (government antitrust suit against defendants subject to extensive
FMB and CAB regulation decided on merits by court).
12. 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 955 (1952).
13. 107 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Accord, Trans-Pacific Airlines v.
Hawaiian Airlines, 174 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1949).
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contrary solution was found in Slick Airways v. American Airlines,1 4 where
an air cargo carrier with new limited certification from the CAB sued the
established, certificated airlines under the antitrust laws alleging a con-
spiracy to restrain competition in the newly developing air freight business.
The district court retained jurisdiction of the case on the ground that the
CAB was not given authority either to approve a combination of the nature
alleged, and thus to exempt it from the antitrust laws, or to award the
money damages for past injuries sought by the complainants. Where
the agency has neither power to deny relief nor power to grant relief, the
purposes of the primary jurisdiction doctrine could not be served by sending
the injured party to that forum. It is evident in these cases, as both the
S.S.W. and Slick opinions indicated, despite their contrary results, that
the character of the particular activities alleged as violative of the antitrust
act as well as the scope of the regulatory and remedial powers delegated
to the agency become crucial in determining whether a court should hear
the case.
It has long been accepted that the fact of regulation by the government
does not exempt the industry from the application of antitrust policy in
favor of competition. 15 However, where the antitrust relief sought is a
matter subject to the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency, "the unity of the
system of regulation" requires that the injured party seek that relief
from the agency and follow the channel for judicial review estab-
lished by the regulatory statute.16 But in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Rail-
road, 7 a limitation on this doctrine was established. In that case the state
of Georgia petitioned the Supreme Court for leave to enter suit against
some twenty railroads under the Sherman Act, alleging a rate-fixing com-
bination in the form of tariff conferences and bureaus which discriminated
against southern shippers. The Court granted the petition on the theory
that the ICC was without power to enjoin a combination which fixed rates
within the zone of reasonableness, and that such a combination in so re-
straining individual initiative to seek lower or non-discriminatory rates
would violate the Sherman Act.' 8 Since Georgia asked only that rate-
fixing practices, and not rates, be enjoined, there was no need for pre-
liminary resort to the ICC for a determination of the reasonableness of
prevailing rates. An ICC order based on a finding that the prevailing rates
14. 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951) (decision by Chief Judge Forman who
also decided the instant case).
15. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939) (antitrust policy in
favor of competition applies to the extent that it is not specifically repudiated by
the regulatory statute) ; McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944)
(regulatory agency with broad powers of exemption must nevertheless give weight
to general antitrust policy in favor of competition).
16. Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 297 U.S. 500, 513
(1936).
17. 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (5-4 decision).
18. But cf. Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952) (FMB,
unlike ICC, does have power to approve rate conference agreements: hence antitrust
charge against dual-rate system of ship line association must first be heard before
that agency).
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were discriminatory, and hence unreasonable, the Court reasoned, would
not cure the fundamental wrong of the collusive influence on rates."
The Georgia and Slick cases, are distinguishable from the instant
decision for here both the fundamental matter complained of and the
power to grant complete relief lay within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The
gravamen of Seatrain's complaint is the collective refusal by the defendant
railroads to deliver freight cars under Rule Four of the Association.
Rule Four and practices under it are subject to control and change by the
ICC, unlike the agreement to fix rates condemned in the Georgia case.
Seatrain asked the court to grant it access to the national freight car pool.
However, determining the conditi6ns upon which access should be granted
involves a host of related matters within the special competence of the
ICC, such as per diem payments, switching charges, joint rates and their
division, contributions to the national freight car pool, and participation
in the burden of empty car movement. Although the alleged combining
to boycott might be enjoined, the affirmative relief sought by Seatrain
would seem to require expert ruling on these terms of interchange. This
situation is unlike Georgia where total relief could be obtained by en-
joining the rate-fixing combination without establishing a new rate struc-
ture for the South. The instant case is also unlike Slick in that the ICC
does have power to approve or disapprove the interchange situation com-
plained of, and to grant reparation for any damages suffered as a result of
the alleged combination.
2 0
Nevertheless, reason to withhold total relief should not compel with-
holding partial relief, if the circumstances justify that course, in the form of
an injunction against the railroad's alleged combination to boycott Seatrain.
Referring the present controversy to the ICC perhaps mean that twenty
years of conflict will continue unresolved for several more years,2 ' since
this probably will involve a comprehensive proceeding to 'determine
Seatrain's proper status in the industry.22  In the meantime Seatrain is
without relief from the alleged collective boycott. The ICC's 1941 inter-
change order, affirmed by the Supreme Court's 1945 opinion, gave the
19. The Court conceded that Georgia could not obtain money damages for rea-
sonable rates which were the result of an illegal price-fixing agreement. Id. at
453. See Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
20. The Interstate Commerce Act does not provide for treble damages as does
the Sherman Act. However, limiting an injured party to non-penal damages against
railroads may perhaps be rationalized in that the railroads do not stand in the
position to gain the unrestricted profits that non-regulated companies could reab
from unfair trade practices. It is the latter to whom the treble damage provision
of the Sherman Act is particularly applicable.
There is a question whether the Commission has power to award damages for
an abuse of process, as alleged. See note 5 supra.
21. The Seatrain litigation at best raises doubts concerning the flexible and
efficient nature of administrative procedures. See Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, 189
F.2d 939, 948 (2d Cir. 1951) (Judge Frank, dissenting, warned against permitting
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies to become a device for the
exhaustion of litigants).
22. See ICC Docket No. 31014, supra note 5, referred to approvingly in the in-
stant case at 128.
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railroads ample notice that concerted efforts to prevent Seatrain's access
to freight cars did not have the approval of the ICC, however justifiably
dissatisfied the railroads may have been with the terms of the 1941 inter-
change order. The Far East Conference case would seem to indicate that
if an alleged combination is disapproved by the agency, it is subject to
the operation of the antitrust laws and properly enjoinable by a court,2
since the combination (and not its injunction) would militate against the
"unity of the system of regulation.9 Such a course by the court would
place the burden on the regulated companies rather than the injured party
to seek a ruling from the regulatory body, where they were given clear
indication that the agency would not exempt the particular practices from
the antitrust law. The circumstances of the instant case might even permit
total relief to be granted by the district court. It would not seem to re-
quire expert technical knowledge to decide whether Seatrain's 1947 move
to another point within the New York port area and subsequent ICC rul-
ings were sufficient to make the 1941 order ineffective. If the order were
determined by the court to be still in effect, the terms of the order would
relieve the court from the necessity of making many technical rulings on
problems related to the interchange in order to grant Seatrain access
to the national freight car pool pending further action by the ICC.
Constitutional Law-
INFORMER'S PRESENCE AT CONFERENCE
DEPRIVATION OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Petitioners, civil service employees of a bridge authority in New York
City, sought to annul a resolution of the authority dismissing them for
corrupt dealings in toll collections. A fellow employee had informed his
superiors of the dishonesty and was told to obtain as much information as
possible about it. The informant thereafter participated in the dealings and
relayed information to his superiors. At his request, he was suspended
with the petitioners (pending a hearing before the authority) in order to
protect him against retaliation. To preserve appearances, the informant
retained the same attorney as the petitioners and visited that attorney with
them on two separate occasions. At the hearing, the informant testified
against petitioners, withdrew his retainer with their attorney, and disclosed
his identity as an informant. It was not shown that the informant's
superiors knew of his participation in the consultations at the time they took
23. Compare the majority in Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S.
570, 573 (1952) weth the dissent, at 578. The anomalous effect of the 1941 order
would seem to bring it somewhere between express disapproval by the agency of
the alleged combination and non-action. Under the majority's rule in Far East
Conference, if there is express disapproval, the antitrust complaint may be heard in
the district court, but if the agency has not ruled on the alleged violation, the com-
plainant must first be heard by the agency.
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place; nor was it shown that the informant acquired from these consulta-
tions any evidence or information used against petitioners. Petitioners
prevailed in the lower courts 1 on their contention that the presence of the
informant at the meetings with their attorney denied them the effective
assistance of counsel secured to them by the New York Constitution.2  On
appeal, the Court of Appeals of New York upheld petitioners' contention,
three justices dissenting. Fusco v. Moses, 304 N.Y. 424, 107 N.E.2d
581 (1952).
While generally the law is unsettled as to whether a party to an ad-
ministrative hearing has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel,8
it has long been held in New York that, a public employee has this right
in an administrative hearing on the question of his dismissal.4 New York 5
is in accord with the general rule 6 that in a criminal case an imprisoned
defendant is entitled to consult with his counsel apart from the hearing of
his jailors. However, the testimony of one who is an eavesdropper
(whether by accident or design) upon attorney-client consultations is not
excluded by the common law privilege.7 This last principle has been an
important reason for the general rule barring jailors from such conferences
under the right to counsel, for their ability to testify to what they hear will
deter any confidential communication.8 In Coplon v. United States 9 the
general rule was extended in a holding that a defendant in a federal criminal
case was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel when federal agents
wiretapped private telephone calls between defendant and his attorney
before and during trial. In the Coplon case, as in the instant case, the inter-
ception of the communications was unknown to the defendants, and hence
1. Fusco v. Moses, 200 Misc. 196, 104 N.Y.S.2d 976 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term),
aff'd per curiam, 279 App. Div. 737, 108 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1st Dep't 1951).
2. ". . . in any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed
to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions..." N.Y.
CONST. ART. I, § 6.
3. PARKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 56-57 (1952).
4. People ax rel. Campbell v. Hannan, 56 Hun 469, 10 N.Y. Supp. 71 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd per curian., 125 N.Y. 691, 26 N.E. 751 (1890) (policeman); People
ax rel. Ellett v. Flood, 64 App. Div. 209, 71 N.Y. Supp. 1067 (3d Dep't 1901) (fire-
man). According to the Hannrn case, the administrative body is for this purpose
a "court," and the hearing is a "trial" within the meaning of the constitutional
provision. In cases of appeals of disciplinary action against civil service employees
from the employing body to a civil service commission, the right to the assistance
of counsel is granted by CIVIL SERVICE LA w § 22(3). Such an appeal is an alter-
native remedy to appeal to the courts. Ibid. There is no similar provision as to
disciplinary proceedings before the employing body itself. Id. §22(1), (2).
5. People ax rel. Burgess v. Risley, 66 How. Prac. 67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1883).
But cf. Hughes v. Cashin, 184 Misc. 757, 54 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
6. E.g., Turner & Barton v. State, 91 Tex. Cr. 627, 241 S.W. 162 (1922);
In re Rider, 50 Cal. App. 797, 195 Pac. 965 (1920). Cf. United States v. Venuto,
182 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1950).
7. State v. Falsetta, 43 Wash. 159, 86 Pac. 168 (1906). See also 8 WIGmoRE,
EVIDENCE § 2326 (3d ed. 1940)..
8. See Turner & Barton v. State, 91 Tex. Cr. 627, 631, 241 S.W. 162, 164
(1922).
9. 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952).
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could not deter the consultation."0 The present case holds that it is
unnecessary to show that the information obtained by interception of the
conversations has actually been used against the defendant. The theory is,
apparently, that some such use should be presumed because of the difficulty
of proving that any use has been made of the information thus acquired
when the prosecution has not attempted to introduce into evidence the
conversations themselves.1 However, the present case goes further in
presuming that the information was communicated by the informant to the
prosecution, although there was no evidence of this fact or that the prosecu-
tion authorized the informant's action. Here, too, the court apparently felt
that the difficulty of proof justified a presumption as the safest course.
If the court's presumptions are accepted, the question remains whether
the right to counsel should protect the accused against the secret inter-
ception of his conversations with his attorney. The federal rule prohibiting
admission or use of evidence acquired by unreasonable search and seizure 
2
applies to evidence secured by gaining admission to premises under false
pretenses,' 3 but concerns only objects, such as documents, and does not
apply to evidence of an intangible nature, such as that secured by the inter-
ception of a conversation."' The policy of the federal search and seizure
rule is to deter objectionable methods used by the police to obtain evidence
and "leads" by rendering such practices fruitless. Inasmuch as New York
has consistently rejected the federal rule,' 5 the instant case can hardly be
regarded as extending that rule to evidence of an intangible nature. Nor
can the instant case be supported as an instance of conflict of interest among
several defendants represented by the same counsel which, when the gov-
ernment has secured such representation, may cause a deprivation of the
right to counsel.' 6 The right protected in the Coplon case and the instant
case is, apparently, sui generis and grounded, at least in part, on the theory
that it is a palpable interference with the effective assistance of counsel,
rendering the trial unfair, for the prosecution covertly to gain knowledge
of the strategy planned by the defendant and his attorney.' 7  The Court
of Appeals of New York has pointed out that in unreasonable search and
10. See 21 FORDHAm L. REv. 175, 177 (1952).
11. However, in the Cop[o= case the court went beyond a mere presumption,
holding that if the Government were found to have wiretapped attorney-client con-
versations a new trial must be had, even though the court considered that it was
clearly shown that the prosecution had introduced no evidence secured by wire-
tapping.
12. See 8 WinmoRE, EVwENcE § 2184 (3d ed. 1940).
13. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
14. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
15. People v. Richter's Jewelers, Inc., 291 N.Y. 161, 51 N.E.2d 690 (1943);
People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636 (1903), aff'd, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
16. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); People v. Fritz, 279 App.
Div. 1020, 111 N.Y.S.2d 734 (2d Dep't 1952) ; but cf. Penn v. Smyth, 188 Va. 367,
49 S.E.2d 600 (1948). In the instant case, the petitioners' attorney never under-
took to represent the informant except as a person with the same interests as the
other petitioners, and the informant dropped his retainer when it was disclosed that
his interests were not the same.
17. See 21 FoRwHAm L. Rlv. 175 (1952).
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seizure cases there are other remedies, civil and criminal, for the officer's
trespass.' 8 The apparent absence of such remedies against the informant
in the instant case 19 makes the decision a logical extension of the New York
rule, while approaching the policy of the federal search and seizure rule.
If the primary basis for the present decision is the policy of deterring
undesirable police practices, some authorization of the informant to act in
an investigative capacity must exist before the evidence obtained may be
excluded; for if there is no such authorization, the state authority is not at
fault in failing to control his conduct. But if the present decision is based
primarily upon the premise that possible knowledge of the defendant's
strategy may in itself prevent a fair trial, his rights would be violated even
if the prosecution obtained the knowledge by mere chance from a stranger.
Such a result would, in effect, enlarge considerably the common law attor-
ney-client privilege in cases to which the government is a party.
The trial court in the instant case noted that annulling the order of
dismissal would not bar the bridge authority from further proceedings to
dismiss petitioners for the alleged misconduct.20 Even if the sole reason
for a new hearing here is the prosecution's knowledge of defense strategy,
the importance of the public interest in discharging those guilty of mal-
feasance in office overrides the imposition upon the defense of the burden
of devising new strategy, a burden inescapable in any retrial. As to evi-
dence or leads to evidence improperly gained, it would seem sufficient to
place upon the prosecution the burden of proving that contested evidence
which it seeks to introduce was properly obtained.21 The total disqualifica-
tion of the informant as a witness would be too drastic and would not neces-
sarily accomplish the exclusion of improper evidence.
Criminal Law-
MENS REA NOT REQUIRED FOR
GRAFT CONVICTION
A manufacturer of electronics equipment was convicted of violating a
statute making it a crime to offer or give gifts to an employee of the United
States "in connection with the procurement of" materials under the Mutual
18. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 19, 150 N.E. 585, 586-587, cert. denied,
270 U.S. 657 (1926).
19. See PRossER, TORTS §§25(e), 107 (1941).
20. Supra, note 1 at 199, 104 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
21. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341-342 (1939), approving
a hearing before the judge without jury in cases where it is claimed that there
has been wiretapping by the Government in violation of §605 of the COMMUNICA-
TIONS Acr OF 1934, 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §605 (1946). The court states
that once the defendant establishes "that a substantial portion of the case against
him was the fruit of the poisonous tree," the Government bears the burden of proving
the independent origin of its evidence.
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Defense Assistance Act.' The court of appeals affirmed the conviction,
holding that mens rea was not a necessary element of the crime as the
statute created an offense unknown to the common law and makes no
mention of any requisite state of mind. Razete v. United States, 199 F.2d
44 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,'21 U.S.L. WEEK 3170 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1952).
The traditional concept of the common law that mens rea is an essen-
tial element in the proof of every crime,2 although adopted as the general
guide for the construction of statutory crimes where the legislature does not
expressly require intent,3 has been modified in regard to offenses where
it clearly appears that the legislature intended the act alone to be punish-
able.4 Where a court finds such a statutory offense, sometimes referred
to as a "public welfare offense," 5 "civil offense" 6 or "public tort," 7 the rule
of construction has been that state of mind is immaterial.8 In Morissette
v. United States, the Court set up several guides for the courts in deter-
mining the existence of a public welfare offense. 9 Some of the character-
istics to be considered are whether a violation of the statute impairs con-
trols essential to social order, involves the same injury to the people
irrespective of the intent of the actor, might be prevented by the exercise
of due care, involves a small penalty, does not indicate moral depravity, and
was not a crime at common law.
Had the requirement of specific intent been read into the present stat-
ute, the offense described would seem to have been covered by the long
existing bribery statute,10 which enacts the common law *elements of that
crime." The gist of the offense under the bribery statute is the transfer
of anything of value to an officer of the United States with the specific
intent of thereby influencing his official decision.12 The graft offense in-
1. 63 STAT. 721, 22 U.S.C. § 1584 (1949) : "Whoever offers or gives to anyone
who is now or in the past two years has been an employee or officer of the United
States any commission, payment, or gift, in connection with the procurement of
equipment, materials, or services under this chapter . . . shall upon conviction
thereof be subject to a fine of not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment for not to
exceed three years, or both."
2. 4 BL Comm. *21; 1 BIsHop, CamiwAu LAw §287 (9th ed. 1923).
3. The "general rule is that in all statutory crimes involving moral turpitude,
intent is implied as a necessary ingredient, though the statute does not expressly so
require." Seaboard Oil Co. v. Cunningham, 51 F.2d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 1931). See
also Masters v. United States, 42 App. D.C. 350 (1914); CLARc & MARSALI,
Cpmszs § 41 (4th ed. 1940).
4. United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922); United States v. Balint,
258 U.S. 250 (1922). For extended documentation of offenses not requiring mens
rea, see Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoL. L. REy. 55, 84-88 (1933).
5. Ibid.
6. Perkins, The Civil Offense, 100 U. oF PA. L. R.v. 832 (1952).
7. Note, 35 HARv. L. RFv. 462 (1922).
8. Rand v. State, 129 Ala. 119, 29 So. 844 (1900). The Constitution does not
bar the creation of a crime which does not require mens rea. Shevlin-Carpenter
Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
9. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (Supp. 1951).
11. United States v. Gree, 136 Fed. 618, aff'd, 199 U.S. 601 (1905).
12. In re Yee Gee, 83 Fed. 145 (D. Wash. 1897).
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volved in the instant case was presumably enacted to cover specified situa-
tions where the bribery statute was deemed inadequate or the proof of
intent to influence inordinately difficult.' 3 Unknown at common law, it is
aimed at the area where influence exerted upon or a gift made to a single
public official even without the intent necessary for bribery might neverthe-
less result in a subversion of government service. The prevalence of al-
legations of influence-peddling in government at the time of enactment of
the statute and its legislative history 14 suggest that it was the purpose of
Congress to eliminate practices detrimental to the public welfare which were
beyond the effective reach of existing law.' 5
The provision in the graft statute that the gift be "in connection with
the procurement" of materials, in the absence of the bribery statute might
have been construed to require the proof of the intent improperly to in-
fluence a public official. Case law has yet to determine whether the require-
ment of "connection" may still retain an element of purpose permitting
the defense of other legitimate intent. Without this requirement, mere
concurrence of a gift with contract negotiations is all that is necessary, and
the crime could include acts entirely innocent of any corrupting tendency.16
While both the common sense of the jury and the prosecutor's discretion
exercised in light of the primary purposes of the statute will be protective
checks, this possibility of reaching the morally innocent cautions against
the multiplication of public welfare offenses with the substantial penalties
here permissible. In the instant case, however, these dangers may be
minimal because the statute applies only to a group who may be expected
to have knowledge of its proscriptions. Furthermore, the individual is not
required to act at his peril, but can completely refrain from the prohibited
activity '7 which in any event was ordinarily of doubtful propriety.
International Law-
CONFLICT OF JUDICIARY AND EXECUTIVE AS TO
CONTINUED EFFECT OF EXTRADITION TREATY
Proceedings for extradition to Yugoslavia were brought against peti-
tioner under provisions of a treaty concluded between the United States and
Serbia in 1902.1 Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus for release on
13. For an indication of the temper of Congress concerning the five-percenter
problem, see 95 CoNG. REc. 8004 (1949).
14. H.R. REP. No. 1265, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1949).
15. An instance of another relationship found so sensitive as to warrant prohi-
bition of all gifts occurs in the statute outlawing loans and gratuities to bank ex-
aminers from officers and employees of banks belonging to the federal reserve system
or whose deposits are insured by the government. 18 U.S.C. §217 (Supp. 1951).
16. Thus a birthday gift to one who had been a procurement officer within the
past two years from his brother who happens to be a government contractor could
become a crime.
17. A flagrant example of a statute where that is not so is IowA CODE c. 502,
§26 (1950) (Blue Sky law making false statements criminal does not require
knowledge of falsity).
1. 32 STAT. 1890 (1902).
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bail claiming, first, that the treaty had terminated, because Serbia had
ceased to be an independent state, and thus was of no effect with the suc-
ceeding state of Yugoslavia; and second, that the crimes alleged were of a
political nature and, therefore, were not extraditable offenses. 2 Although
the State Department had recognized the treaty as continuing in force with
Yugoslavia,3 the court held that the termination of a treaty was a judicial
rather than a political question and, after taking judicial notice of the history
of the two countries, determined that Serbia had ceased to be an independent
state and that the treaty was no longer in existence. This finding made it
unnecessary to consider whether the indictment showed the offenses to be
"political," and petitioner was released on bail. Artukovic v. Boyle, 107
F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
It is recognized that a change in sovereignty may result in the assump-
tion by the new state of rights and duties of its predecessor. 4 The par-
ticular obligations which devolve on a given state will depend on the cir-
cumstances, but a few general principles of succession are applicable to all
cases. Thus political obligations which are of a personal nature, such as
treaties of alliance, will fall with the extinct state.5 On the other hand local
laws, 6 property rights 7 and even fiscal obligations 8 may survive. Usually
disagreement as to succession arises between the executive branches of the
signatories or their successors, but tri-partite constitutional government
gives rise in the instant case to the question whether a court may disregard
executive agreement that a former treaty remains in effect. Three main
considerations are involved in the determination of such an issue. In the
first place the cases indicate that treaties are not lightly set aside; 9 thus
a change in the form of government within a state does not affect its treaty
obligations.10 Secondly, although the Law of Nations is a part of the law
of the land, American courts have to some extent limited their powers of
interpretation and application by declaring certain matters to be within the
2. Id. at 1892.
3. 13 Dzp'T STATE BuLL 1020 (1945); 14 Dz"T STATE BuLl. 728 (1946). This
treaty was also considered to be in force with the preceding Yugoslav government.
See TREAns IN FORcE oN Dc. 31, 1941, 94 (U.S. Dep't State 1944).
4. 1 OPPEHZ, INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (6th ed., Lauterpacht 1947).
5. Id. at 153. See also McNAnm, THE LAW OF TREATmS, 389 (1938).
6. See Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546
(1885).
7. Case of the German Settlers in Poland, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 6 (1923).
8. 1 OPPENHEIM, INmTENAInONAL LAW 154. But cf. Texas Bond Cases, Mixed
Cl. Comm'n (1854).
9. In re Lepeschkin, Swiss Federal Court, Feb. 2, 1923; United States v.
Jordan, 1 Extraterritorial Cases, 259, 260 (U.S. Ct. for China 1912).
10. United States v. Jordan, supra note 9; In re Lepeschkin, supra note 9 (also
discussing the application of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus which is not here
involved); 1 OPPENHEIm, INTERNATIOxAL LAW 843. Another example of the in-
destructability of treaties is the principle that war does not abrogate a treaty ipso
facto, but only to the extent that its provisions are inconsistent with hostilities.
See Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920), 38 YAim L.J. 514 (1928).
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exclusive competence of the political departments of the government."
Thus the recognition of a foreign government,' 2 the authority of a foreign
representative to deal with our government,' 3 and the executive deter-
mination of national boundaries 14 will not be scrutinized by the courts.
Similarly, whether the United States has violated a treaty is not a judicial
question.' 5  In questions of treaty interpretation the courts will generally
feel bound by subsequent legislation 16 or congressional interpretation.17
In some instances the courts have made an independent determination, but
if the political departments have made a decision as to the matter in issue
the courts have rather consistently adopted that position.'8 Thus in Ter-
linden v. Ames,19 where the question was whether an extradition treaty
with Prussia was terminated by the incorporation of Prussia into the Ger-
man Empire, the court held that action of the executive department recog-
nizing the treaty as being in force was of controlling importance.20 Execu-
tive action was given like weight in a similar case involving a treaty with
Bavaria.2 1 The construction given by the executive department to a word
in a treaty has been adopted by the courts; 2 2 and cases involving the extent
to which a treaty has been abrogated by war indicate that a declaration by
the executive department will govern.23 While the term "political depart-
ments" is understood as meaning the executive or legislative branch of the
11. See Dickinson, International Political Questions in The National Courts, 19
Am. J. IT'L L. 157 (1925); Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the
Federal Courts, 8 MINx. L. REv. 485 (1924). For the development of the doctrine
see Note, 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 79 (1948).
12. United States v. Jordan, supra note 9; In re Taylor, 118 Fed. 196 (D.C.
Mass. 1902).
13. Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635 (U.S. 1853). See also Earn Line S.S. Co. v.
Sutherland S.S. Co., 254 Fed. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
14. See Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 307 (U.S. 1829). Cf. Tartar Chemical
Co. v. United States, 116 Fed. 726 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902).
15. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Ware v. Hylton, 3
DalI. 199 (U.S. 1796).
16. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curtis 454
(C.C. Mass. 1855).
17. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); Society for the Propa-
gation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, 490 (U.S. 1823).
18. However the position of the executive has been rejected where construction
of an American statute was also involved. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335
U.S. 377 (1948) (leasehold of the United States in Bermuda is a "possession"
within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act despite a contrary contention
by the Department of State) ; Tartar Chemical Co. v. United States, 116 Fed. 726
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902) (holding that Algeria is part of France within the meaning
of the Tariff Act although the Department of State maintained that it was not).
19. 184 U.S. 270 (1902).
20. In this case both countries had continued to extradite persons under the
treaty.
21. In, re Thomas, 12 Blatch. 370 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1874).
22. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913) (Following the State Department's
construction of the word "persons" in an extradition treaty with Italy).
23. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, supra note 17;
Goos v. Brocks, 117 Neb. 750, 223 N.W. 13 (1929). Cf. Techt v. Hughes, 229
N.Y. 222, 242, 247, 128 N.E. 185, 192-3 (1920) (here the court made an independent
interpretation, but there had been no executive action taken).
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government, there is no clear indication as to the type of action which will
be deemed controlling or by whom it must be taken. However, continued
extradition proceedings under a treaty,24 a mandate for arrest issued by the
Department of State,25 and the construction of a term or a mere declaration
by the Secretary of State 2 6 seem to have been sufficient. Thirdly, it is
recognized that international agreements may be concluded which do not
require the advice and consent of the Senate.2 7 This power derives from
the sovereign nature of the national government rather than from the treaty
making power of the Constitution.28 Thus, in the instant case, the holding
that the treaty with Serbia no longer exists would not preclude an inquiry
as to whether the subsequent mutual recognition by the United States and
Yugoslavia of the treaty's existence constituted a valid pact which should
be enforced.
29
The court in the instant case did not consider this latter possibility.
It made an independent determination as to the existence of the treaty,
rejected the position of the State Department, and rested its decision on-
history. The Terlinden case was distinguished on the ground that for gov-
ernmental action to control there must be actual extradition of persons be-
tween the countries; mere statements or correspondence were held in-
sufficient. Such a qualification of the requisite action is not substantiated
by the other cases in the area,30 nor does it seem warranted as a matter of
policy. The "political questions" doctrine was formulated to enable the
government to carry out a unified foreign policy without the danger of
embarrassment by conflicting court decisions.3 ' Once the government has
announced its position in some way a subsequent overruling by a court is
bound to have an adverse effect on the conduct of foreign affairs. This
rationale should not be lightly brushed aside, for the court in the instant
case cannot adequately evaluate the action of the Department of State and
the delicate considerations that bear on its acknowledgment of treaty obliga-
tions with Yugoslavia. It is possible that there may be instances in which
the protection of individual rights might take precedence over this desire
24. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902).
25. In re Thomas, supra note 21.
26. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); Mahoney v. United States, 10
Wall. 62 (U.S. 1869); Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 242, 128 N.E. 185, 192
(1920).
27. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (involving the assignment
by Russia of claims to the United States and executed by the President in connection
with the recognition of the Russian government) ; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203 (1942) (involving the same assignment). See United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
28. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., supra note 27.
29. But for an indication that the extradition of persons must be carried on in
accordance with a treaty and not by executive agreement see the Case of Arguelles,
DICINSON, THE LAw oF NAois 706 (1929). See also Valentine v. United States,
299 U.S. 5 (1936) ; 6 Ops. Att'y Gen. 431 (1854) and 6 Ops. Att'y Gen. 85 (1853).
30. See notes 24-26 supra.
31. See Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635, 657 (U.S. 1853); Foster v. Neilson, 2
Pet. 253, 309 (U.S. 1829); Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 260 (U.S. 1796); Earn
Line S.S. Co. v. Sutherland S.S. Co., 254 Fed. 126, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
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for unified action. In the instant case such protection might in fact have
been afforded if the alleged crimes were found to be of a political nature 
3 2
and therefore not extraditable offenses even under a valid treaty. In view
of this protection, the more desirable result lies in a deference to the gov-
ernment's announced policy in respect to the treaty.
Selective Service-
VALIDITY OF CONFIDENTIAL F. B. I. REPORT IN
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR CLASSIFICATION
The Selective Service Act of 19481 provides that the appeal board
processing a registrant's objection to a denial by the local board of his
request for conscientious objector status 2 shall refer the claim to the Depart-
ment of Justice for inquiry, hearing, and an advisory report.
3 The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in invalidating a conviction for Selective
Service Act violation held that the statutory provision for a hearing im-
plicitly requires that the contents of the F.B.I. report of the inquiry be
disclosed to the registrant at or before the hearing. In effect, in holding
that in the absence of such disclosure the classification procedure is void,
the court proscribes the F.B.I. practice of affording anonymity to those
individuals whose disclosures furnish in part the basis of the registrant's
32. Artukovic v. Boyle, 107 F. Supp. 11, 34 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
1. 62 STAT. 622 (1948), 50 U.S.C. APP. §462 (Supp. 1952).
2. In the instant case defendant was classified 1-A-O (available for noncom-
batant military service) when he claimed to be entitled to 1-0 (formally IV-E,
available for alternative civilian service). See SIBLEY & JACOB, CONSCRIPTION OF
CONSCIENCE 56 (1952); TATUm, HANDBOOK FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS 11
(1952).
3. 62 STAT. 609 (1948), 50 U.S.C. API'. §456 (j), as amended, 64 STAT. 1074
(1950), 65 STAT. 83 (1951), provides that ". . . Any person claiming exemption
from combatant training and service because of such conscientious objections shall,
if such claim is not sustained by the local board, be entitled to an appeal to the
appropriate appeal board. Upon the filing of such appeal, the appeal board shall
refer any such claim to the Department of Justice for inquiry and hearing. The
Department of Justice, after appropriate inquiry, shall hold a hearing with respect
to the character and good faith of the objections of the person concerned, and such
person shall be notified of the time and place of such hearing." The Department
of Justice after such hearing shall recommend to the appeal board that the registrant
be classified as available for non-combatant military service, or available for alter-
nate civilian service, or available for military service. ". . . The appeal board shall,
in making its decision, give consideration to, but shall not be bound to follow, the
recommendations of the Department of Justice together with the record on appeal
from the local board." In practice the result of the inquiry is an F.B.I. report
which is available to the hearing examiner before the hearing. The hearing officer
makes a written report to the Department of Justice which then makes a report
to the appeal board. In the instant case the appeal board had available to it the
reports of both the hearing officer and a Special Assistant to the Attorney General,
but not that of the F.B.I. The registrant does not personally appear before the
appeal board.
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classification. United States v. Nugent, 200 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1952), peti-
tion for cert. granted, 21 U.S.L. WEEK 3246 (U.S. Mar. 16, 1953).3a
Although the Selective Service Act specifies that the decision of the
local board with respect to classification shall be final," except where under
the regulations administrative review is provided,5 the Supreme Court has
held that a registrant may base either a habeas corpus petition for release
from the army 6 or a defense in a criminal evasion trial 7 upon the invalidity
of the classification procedure provided he has completed the administrative
process.8 The theory is that the administrative authority loses jurisdiction
where either the classification is without basis in fact 9 or the product of an
arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.'
Judge Frank in the instant case appeared to adopt by rather extended
reference the district court opinion in United States v. Geyer," where it
was reasoned that since the registrant had already had an opportunity be-
fore the local board to create a full record, the purpose of the personal
departmental hearing must be to enable the registrant to meet the contents
of the F.B.I. report. Thus it is inferred that the Act envisaged both that
the registrant be advised as to the contents of the F.B.I. report and that
it shall go forward to the appeal board as part of the record, since in order
to evaluate 12 the recommendations of the Justice Department the board
must have access to the entire record upon which the recommendation is
based.
3a. See Elder v. United States, 21 U.S.L. WEEic 2441 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 1953),
holding contra the instant case.
4. 62 STAT. 620 (1948), 50 U.S.C. APP. §460(b)(3) (Supp. 1952).
5. 32 CODE FED. REGS. §§ 1626-1627 (1951 Rev. Ed.).
6. Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946) ; United States
ex rel. De Graw v. Toon, 151 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1945).
7. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946). This is also a valid defense
for walking out of public service camp. Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442 (1947).
8. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946). See SiaBLy & JAcoB, op. cit.
.vtpra note 2, at 422-428.
Mandamus to local boards has never been recognized. United States v. Mancuso,
139 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1943); Bullard v. Selective Service Local Board of Major
County, 50 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Okla. 1943). But cf. Warren v. Abernathy, 198
F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1952). Drumheller v. Berks County Local Board No. 1, 130
F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1942) held certiorari to a local board inappropriate. See note 16
infra.
9. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946). In n. 14 the court admits that
this is the same standard as applied to alien expulsion cases where Congress also
made the order of the administrative agency final. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326
U.S. 135 (1945). But see HART & WEcHsLER, THE FEDEAL CouRTs & FEERAL
SYsTEm 399 (Temp. Ed. 1953) where the Court's reasoning is questioned.
Actually this similararity might prove illusory since the hearing in the expulsion
cases is compulsory under the Constitution, see 101 U. or PA. L. REv. 413 (1952),
while it is not clear just what minimum administrative selective service classification
procedure Congress may constitutionally provide.
10. Goff v. United States, 135 F.2d 610, 612 (1943), cited in Estep v. United
States, 327 U.S. 114, 123 (1946). The same review standard is applied to both
criminal cases and habeas corpus actions. Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442
(1947).
11. Opinion by Hincks J. 108 F. Supp. 70 (S.D. Conn. 1952).
12. Judge Hincks interprets 50 U.S.C. APP. §456(j), supra note 3, as creating
the duty to evaluate.
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The use of the confidential F.B.I. report has been the basis of various
constitutional or statutory attacks upon the conscientious objector classifica-
tion procedure. In Imboden v. United States,18 where it appeared that the
F.B.I. report did go to the appeal board but that the registrant was only
advised of the general nature1 4 of its contents, the Sixth Circuit held that
on the basis of Bailey v. Richardson 15 no constitutional rights were violated
since the hearing was neither a criminal trial nor a quasi-judicial pro-
ceeding.' 6
Although Bailey v. Richardson, based as it is upon the question-
begging principle that federal employment is a privilege, seems rather
irrelevant to the problem of the constitutional validity of a statutory selec-
tion procedure, it nevertheless appears likely that the court in Imboden,
whatever its reasoning, was correct in its conclusion. It is not clear just
what minimum administrative selective service classification procedure
Congress may constitutionally provide once it has established that a par-
ticular category of registrants is exempt. It may be that since it is within
the power of Congress to draft every registrant,"7 it is possible for Con-
gress to define the exempt category simply as the product of a particular
selection process. The general tenor of war power cases suggests's that
13. 194 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1952). Contra: United States v. Geyer, 108 F. Supp.
70 (D. Conn. 1952). See also United States v. Oller, 107 F. Supp. 54 (D. Conn. 1952)
where the court held that when the Justice Department report was adverse to the
registrant's interests he was prejudiced by the inability of the appeal board to ex-
amine the F.B.I. report, but when the Justice Department report supported the
registrant's claim the inability of the appeal board to examine the F.B.I. report
would not be prejudicial. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals on the basis of the
statutory interpretation of the instant case has held in United States v. Packer,
200 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1952) that although "the defendant was told that the FBI
report was altogether favorable to him. . . . the correctness of such representation
was in our opinion a matter which the defendant was entitled to judge for himself
by see the original FBI record." The Packer decision would appear to overrule
United States v. Downer, 139 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1944) on this point.
14. Imboden was advised in part that:
"A woman who states she had been an active member of the Glenford
Brethren Church for fifty years . . . recalls no one by the name of Imboden."
"An official of the Glenford Brethren Church states .
"A former supervising officer of the Church states . .
15. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by eqztally divided court,
341 U.S. 918 (1951).
16. It is not clear whether a selective service board is quasi-judicial. When
considering the appropriateness of certiorari to such a board the Third Circuit held
the function was not quasi-judicial. Drumheller v. Berks County Local Board No. 1,
130 F.2d 610 (1942). The Sixth Circuit has held that the function is quasi-judicial
in considering the immunity of members from damage suits for misclassification.
Dodey v. Weygandt, 173 F.2d 965 (1949). See also Gibson v. Reynolds, 172 F.2d
95 (8th Cir. 1949). In the instant case, 200 F.2d at 50, judge Frank observes that
although the hearing is not a criminal trial its effect on the defendant might be fully
as important.
17. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
18. An analysis of the "War Powers" cases impresses one that the Court has
consistently approved measures thought by Congress to be necessary to meet
emergency conditions. E.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 757n, 782 (1948);
Selective Draft Law Cases (Arver v. United States) 245 U.S. 366 (1918);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942); Northern Ry. v. Northern Dakota, 250 U.S. 135 (1919); Hamilton v.
Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919) ; Cf. United States v. Cohen
Grocery Company, 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
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any procedure that would reasonably achieve the objective would satisfy
the requirements of due process. But a statutory procedure which as con-
stituted inherently must or in actual operation in fact does produce patent
discrimination in the selection pattern would probably be constitutionally
invalid."9  While the invalidation of the administrative procedure that
involves the use of the confidential F.B.I. report effectively prevents the
practice of affording anonymity to sources, a requirement that the F.B.I.
must disclose the informant's name at trial would effectuate the same
result. Thus consistent with its promise of anonymity, the Government has
repeatedly denied the registrant the privilege of examining the F.B.I. file
at trial?° This refusal is based upon Department of Justice Order No.
3229,21 forbidding the disclosure of confidential papers to a court without
the permission of the Attorney General. The Government supports this
refusal on grounds of the common law privilege afforded an informer's
communication, based upon the public desirability of encouraging such com-
munication? 2 But the Second Circuit has repeatedly held that a criminal
conviction should not stand when the accused has been denied access to
documents relevant to his defense, which are in the possession of the Gov-
ernment, whose regulations make them unavailable at the trial.23  Al-
though there has been no Supreme Court decision on this point the Court
has recently set forth the underlying rationale as being that ". . . since
the Government which prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that
justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution
and then invoke its governmental privilege to deprive the accused of
19. Though the Fifth Amendment unlike the Fourteenth contains no equal pro-
tection clause, LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377 (1920), dicta
are repeatedly met stating that discrimination may be so injurious as to deny due
process, see Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14 (1938); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943).
20. E.g. United States v. Nugent, 200 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1952); Imboden v.
United States, 194 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1952); United States v. Oller, 107 F. Supp.
54 (D. Conn. 1952). But see United States v. Bouziden, 108 F. Supp. 395 (W.D.
Okla. 1952), where the Government permitted the F.B.I. report to be entered into
evidence.
21. 11 Fir. REG. 4920 (1946) made pursuant to REv. STAT. § 161 (1875), 5
U.S.C. § 22 (1946), permitting the Attorney General to proscribe regulations not
inconsistent with law for ". . . the custody, use, and preservation of the records,
papers, and property appertaining to . . ." the Department of Justice. Touhy v.
Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951), held that a subordinate of the Attorney General could
not be held in contempt for refusing to comply with a subpoena duces tecum ordering
such disclosure. Although the court did not face the issue of the immunity pertaining
to the information sought (see concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter), the
Government has erroneously claimed that the decision supports such a claim of such
immunity. See Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 992 (3d Cir. 1951). See
Executive Immnity from Judicial Power to Compel Documentary Disclosures, 51
CoT. L. RFv. 881 (1951).
22. See 8 WIGMORE, EvmEcE §2374(f) (3d ed. 1940). On the privilege that
protects governmental secrets see discussion in United States v. Reynolds, 21 U.S.L.
WEt2 4237 (U.S. March 9, 1953).
23. United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1948) ; United States
v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d
503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944). This doctrine has also been applied to cases under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 995 (3d Cir.
1951).
1953]
696 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101
anything which might be material to his defense." 24  The weight of the
federal cases seems to show that such a restriction upon the informer's
privilege does exist.2 5 Under such a rule, the defendant should be entitled
to examine the F.B.I. report at trial to support his defense of capricious or
arbitrary behavior of the hearing examiner. 26  The failure of the Govern-
ment to permit the entry of the F.B.I. report into evidence in a criminal
evasion trial would in itself then be sufficient basis for dismissal of the case.
A compromise involving a confidential disclosure of the F.B.I. report to the
judge would not solve this difficulty since, although the constitutional right
to a jury trial does not include the right to have a jury pass upon the
validity of an administrative order,27 the opinion in United States v.
Coplon 28 invalidates any procedure whereby evidence of this type is pre-
24. United States v. Reynolds, 21 U.S.L. W.Ex 4237 (U.S. March 9, 1953).
The Court held that this doctrine was not applicable to a case arising under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.
In Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938), the defendant was charged
with illegal possession and transportation of distilled spirits. The Court held that
the officers in making the arrest had observed sufficient action upon which to base
probable cause. Then the Court went on to say, "Moreover, as often pointed out,
public policy forbids disclosure of an informer's identity unless essential to the de-
fense, as for example, where this turns upon an officer's good faith." (Emphasis
added). But in Bowman Dairy v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951), where the
defendant was charged with violation of the Sherman Act, the Court held that
under Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure any document or
other material which has been obtained by the Government by solicitation or volun-
tarily from third persons, and which is admissible in evidence, is subject to subpoena.
But then the Court said, "Where the Court concludes that such materials ought to
be produced, it should, of course, be solicitous to protect against disclosures of the
identity of informants, and the method, manner and circumstances of the Govern-
ment's acquisition of the materials." (Emphasis added). It is not clear in Bowman
whether the defendant desired this confidential information or whether it was essen-
tial to his defense. A definitive Supreme Court decision is also lacking on the allied
question of whether the Government need disclose the name of an informer to
support a claim that the informer's information was sufficient to constitute probable
cause so as to permit a search without warrant. See Scher v. United States, supra.
Usually the court is able to find some reasonable basis other than the informer's
communication. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) ; United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.
1945).
25. E.g., United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 9 F.R.D. 719
(W.D. La. 1949), aff'd by divided court, 339 U.S. 940 (1950); United States v.
Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944) ; United States ex rel. Schluter v. Watkins,
67 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); United States v. General Motors, 2 F.R.D. 528
(N.D. Ill. 1942).
CompARE ANNOvATION, Government privilege against disclosure of official in-
fornation--Federal cases, 95 L.Ed. 425, 431 (1951).
26. United States v. Everngram, 102 F. Supp. 128, (S.D.W.Va. 1951) in United
States ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944), the hearing officer was
in error as to the law in his report, but the Circuit Court returned the case for the
trial court to determine whether the appeal board had adopted this understanding
of the law. In United States v. Bouziden, 108 F. Supp. 395 (W.D. Okla. 1952),
the Court acquitted the defendant when it found he had been denied a fair hearing
when the hearing officer withheld unfavorable information gained during the inquiry,
gave the registrant no opportunity to -rebut it at the hearing, and then used this
same unfavorable information as the basis for his adverse advisory recommendations.
See also United States v. Cain, 149 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1945), for an example of
improper use of advisory panels.
27. Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442 (1947).
28. 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952).
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sented to the judge in camera even in a situation in which the defendant is
not entitled to a jury determination of the questions involved.
The use of confidential evidence as a basis of determining substantial
rights of an individual is inherently obnoxious to due process concepts.
Certainly the interpretation given the statute in the instant case is not
inevitable, but since it appears that secrecy of the source cannot be preserved
at the trial level, there seems no sufficient reason to impair the fairness of
the hearing at the administrative level by denying access to the information.
Though secrecy may be imperatively necessary in certain situations to pro-
tect the security of the nation,2 9 it is not at all clear that it is necessary in
this area to promise anonymity in order to secure sufficient relevant in-
formation.3 0 Placing responsibility upon informers might in many instances
terminally result in more efficient investigative rocedure.31
Statute of Frauds-
PART PAYMENT ON ORIGINAL CONTRACT PERMITS
ENFORCEMENT AS SUBSEQUENTLY MODIFIED
Buyer orally ordered truck parts valued at $7800, and gave seller
$2000 as part payment. Subsequently the parties altered the contract to
increase the quantity ordered to $13,000 and agreed to apply the original
part payment to the contract as modified. Seller instituted suit for the
purchase price after buyer refused to accept the goods. Buyer claimed the
modified contract failed to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.' The court held
29. On exclusion of an alien on the basis of confidential information, the dis-
closure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest under 8 CODE FED. REGs.
175.57 (1949), see Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 21 U.S.L. W=EK 4147 (U.S. Feb.
10, 1953). On government employment see Executive Order No. 9835, 12 FFa.
REG. 1935 (1947).
30. Would either the "active member," "official," or "former supervising officer"
of the Iiboden case, note 14 supra, have withheld their information had the F.B.I.
been incapable of promising anonymity? Possibly such promises in these situations
are the result of administrative inertia. It has been suggested that, considering the
character of the information sought, cross-examination of sources is not necessary
to protect the registrant, since due to the large number of inquiries made the resultant
statistical pattern thereby developed would be valid although a few informants might
not have been factually correct. This idea might be coupled with the belief that even
if such an approach should result in a few erroneous classifications, they become
insignificant considering the magnitude of the task involved. This analysis is based
upon the premise that the character of information sought can be gained from the
consensus of the opinion of a large number of informants. But it is quite possible
that in reality the nature of the person's belief is just the sort of information wherein
a large sample will actually obscure the knowledge of the few whose opinions are
based on valid intimate personal knowledge.
31. See Foltz v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 189 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 871 (1951). J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, warned that the holding of this case-that one naliciously giving
false information to the F.B.I. may be sued for libel by one injured thereby-might
impair the capacities of the F.B.I., N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1951, p. 22, col. 4.
1. Section 17 of the original statute, 29 Car. II, c. 3 (1677) has been incorporated
in § 4 of the UNioRM SALEs AcT, 1 U.L.A. § 4 (1950) ; PA. STAT. Axw. tit. 69, § 42
(Purdon 1931).
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that the original part payment took the modified parol contract out of the
operation of the statute. Macias v. Klein, 106 F. Supp. 107 (W.D. Pa.
1952).
There was no question in the instant case as to the enforceability of
the original parol contract, for there had been a substantial part payment.2
The question presented by the case, however, is whether the original part
payment also casts an aura of authenticity about the subsequent modifica-
tion. This question has been rarely litigated and there is no definitive au-
thority, although there is some support for the proposition that part pay-
ment, to be effective, must be contemporaneous with the oral agree-
ment, and must be made prior to rescission by the parties.3 If the parties in
the instant case had rescinded the original agreement (including a return
of the part payment) and then effected a new and enlarged agreement,
using the same part payment (with a new tender), the second agreement
undoubtedly would satisfy the statute.4 The instant court refused to re-
quire such a formality. "As a practical matter business men, after agree-
ing upon alterations in a parol sale, would act just the way the parties in
the instant case acted." 5 The decision illustrates, perhaps, another instance
of dissatisfaction with the harshness of the operation of the statute, and a
declaration that courts are capable of distinguishing truthful from perjured
testimony without the assistance of a prophylactic rule which is either a
confession of their inability to cope with the problem or of legislative doubt
of judicial capacity.
Section 2-201 of the proposed Commercial Code 6 re-enacts the sub-
stance of Section 4 of the Sales Act and further provides that even when
there is part payment, or delivery and acceptance of part of the goods, the
contract is enforceable only to the extent of the part payment or acceptance.
Under the Sales Act a part payment validated the entire transaction. The
rationalization of the Sales Act position was that part payment was some-
thing more, than "mere words" 7 and had evidentiary significance com-
parable to a writing. However, the fact of part payment may itself have
to be established by parol if the payment is in cash. Furthermore the fact
of part payment.does not disclose the particulars of the transaction between
2. The payment may be any valuable consideration, e.g., H. Feldman's Sons Co.
v. Netsky, 348 Pa. 237, 35 A.2d, 305 (1944) (cancellation of debt).
3. See Obear-Nester Glass Co. v. Lax & Shaw, 11 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1926)
where a contract was orally modified after a down payment, but the contract was
enforced on the theory that after the rescission of the first agreement the holder of
the down payment was obligated to return the down payment and the cancellation
of that obligation constituted a part payment for the modified contract. In Roberts
v. Williams, 6 Wash.2d 599, 108 P.2d 334 (1940), a conditional down payment
was to become effective upon acceptance of an offer. The offer was modified but
the court held that the original deposit covered the modified agreement. But cf.
Ryan v. Gilbert, 320 Mass. 682, 71 N.E.2d 219 (1947) (which the instant court dis-
tinguished on the basis of a Sunday contract element).
4. See Annotations, 170 A.L.R. 241 (1947); 131 A.L.R. 1252 (1941) and cases
cited in note 3 .rpra.
5. Instant case at 109.
6. Final Text Edition (1952).
7. See, e.g., Norton v. Davison, [1899] 1 Q.B. 401, 404.
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the parties and does not even establish the existence of a partially execu-
tory sales contract. The payment may be a loan or overpayment on a prior
transaction. Where, however, it appears that the payment is not referable
to earlier deals and especially where the payment is the only commercial
contact between the parties, it has evidentiary significance and tends to
establish the credibility of the party asserting the existence of the contract.
But even in this situation part payment ordinarily indicates no more than
the minimum size of the contract.8 The same analysis would seem to apply
to the effect of the delivery and acceptance of part of the goods.9 But if
for this reason enforcement is limited to the extent of the part payment or
acceptance, as the Code provides, an honest tradesman may have to dispose
of odd lots with the consequent loss of the unit price and impairment of his
legitimate expectations.' ° The Statute of Frauds has at least the benefit,
where payment supports the existence of a contract, of enforcing that con-
tract in full as it appears to the court.
The Code's position has been criticized as reinvigorating the anti-
quated faith of the Statute of Frauds in a writing." Professor Llewellyn,
the chief draftsman of the Code, argues in justification of its stand that
while the litigated cases contain instances where welchers have been
protected, they do not show how many persons were prevented from press-
ing fraudulent claims. Further, he suggests that the statute fosters the
desirable business practice of a writing, limiting the field of disagreement
over contract terms and assisting slippery memories. But his additional
argument, that commercial practice today is in general accord with the
objectives of the statute because of the "lay feeling" that a deal is not
complete until reduced to writing,12 is certainly not uniformly applicable
to all areas of the economy. It is significant that the British Law Revi-
sion Commission after thorough study has recommended repeal of the
statute as not in accord with present business practices, illogical, and poorly
drafted.'8 Also worthy of note is the fact that almost no civil law juris-
8. If, however, there is a trade custom that upon an order a certain percentage
of the total price is required as a down payment, then the part payment may have
more significance as to the amount of the total transaction.
9. It would seem probable, however, that the fact of delivery will be supported
by some sort of concrete evidence, e.g., invoices, delivery receipts, etc. But unless
such a writing indicates the total amount of the sale it would be no more indicative
of the amount of the entire transaction than the part payment would be.
10. The official comments to § 2-201 of the Code provide for apportionment of the
goods to the amount of money paid where such apportionment is possible. It would
seem that where large machinery or some other unapportionable commodity is in-
volved, no part of the transaction will be enforced. This may further injure the
expectation interest of the buyer.
11. Rabel, The Sales Law in the Proposed Corntnercid Code, 17 C'I. L. Rv.
427, 433 (1950).
12. See LtEwEr.LYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SA.zs 916-917 (1930). See
also the official comments to § 2-201 of the Code.
13. SIxTH I~xmum REPORT, LAw R sGlsqo Commirr, [1937] 2 W.N. 284.
"Contemporary opinion is almost unanimous in condemning the Statute and favouring
its amendment or repeal." Id. at 285. "For obvious reasons, the important business
of buying and selling ought not to be trammelled with unnecessary solemnities; and
such transactions, if they be satisfactorily proved by legal evidence of any kind, ought
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diction retains such a statute.14 The desirability of a writing is nowhere
seriously questioned but in nearly three hundred years the Statute of Frauds
has not eliminated oral trading, and with modern means of communica-
tion appears less likely to do so in the future. As a result, where condi-
tions favor oral dealings the requirement serves only to decrease the ease
of consummating enforceable transactions, 15 to deny effect to even the
clearest showing of a contract and to advance the ends of the least desirable
commercial elements. General dissatisfaction with the operation of the
statute as evidenced by judicial limitations on its effect, the reluctance of
counsel to invoke its provisions in the ordinary case, and the persistent
agitation for its repeal suggest the inadvisability of perpetuating such a
prophylactic rule. The Code in doing so is more sternly logical than the
Statute of Frauds, but consequently even more destructive to such reason-
able transactions as the one concerned in the instant case.
Witnesses-
ADMISSIBILITY OF WIFE'S TESTIMONY AGAINST
HUSBAND IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Defendants were prosecuted for conspiracy to violate statutes for-
bidding obtaining entry into this country by wilfully false representations.'
The government charged that three United States veterans brought per-
sons of foreign nationality into the United States by marriages contrived
for the sole purpose of obtaining entry to the United States under the War
Brides Act.2 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
conviction of the defendants, holding that the marriages were invalid and
to be binding." SECOND REPORT OF THE CoMmisslONmts ON MEncANTII. LAWS OF
THE UN TE KlxDom¢, 354 Parliamentary Papers 6 (1855). See also James,
Statite of Frauds, 24 N.Z.L.J. 301 (1948) (recommending repeal of the Statute
as it pertains to sales of goods). For an exhaustive compilation and analysis of
arguments against the Statute, see Willis, The Statute of Frauds-A Legal
Anachronisn, 3 IND. L.J. 427; 3 id. 528 (1928).
14. Rabel, spra note 11, at 433.
15. This tendency is to some extent mitigated by section 2-201(2) of the Code,
which provides that as between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing
in confirmation of the contract is received and the party receiving such confirmation
knows or has reason to know of its contents and does not object within 10 days, then
he is denied, the protection of the Statute. The probable basis for this innovation
is suggested by the draftsman, LLEWELLYN, op. cit. suprw note 12, at 918. This pro-
vision has been roundly criticized, Rabel, supra note 11, at 434.
1. "Any alien who . . . obtains entry to the United States by a willful false
or misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material fact, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor. . . ." 45 STAT. 1551, 8 U.S.C. § 180a (1946) ; "Whoever
knowingly makes any false statement in any . . . document required by the immi-
gration laws . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more
than five years or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (Supp. 1946).
2. ". . . alien spouses or alien children of United States citizens serving in,
or having an honorable discharge certificate from the armed forces of the United
States during the Second World War shall, if otherwise admissible under the
immigration laws . . . be admitted to the United States." 59 STAT. 659 (1945),
8 U.S.C. §232 (1946).
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that therefore the district court had not erred in admitting the testimony
of the wives against the husbands over the objection of defendants' counsel
that spouses are incompetent to testify against each other in criminal cases.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding inter alia that, whether
or not the marriages were valid,3 the testimony of the alleged spouses was
admissible.4 Lutwak v. United States, 73 Sup. Ct. 481 (1953).
The common law doctrine was that a wife could not testify either for
or against her husband.5 The rule is said to have developed from a natural
repugnance to condemning a man on the testimony of those who lived
under his roof,6 and a desire to preserve the harmony of married life.
7
It has been extensively modified by state legislation; 8 but except for limit-
ing the rule to criminal cases,9 Congress has not seen fit to legislate on the
subject to any appreciable extent.
In Funk v. United States,'0 the Supreme Court eliminated the dis-
qualification of a wife to testify for her husband. The courts of appeal, with
but one exception,"' have refused to further dissipate the common law
rule 12 in the absence of a mandate from Congress or the Supreme Court.'3
3. The holding was based on the reasoning that these marriages, valid or not,
were not the type "which Congress must have had in mind when it made provision
for 'alien spouse.? in the War Brides Act. . . ." Instant case at 486. Justices
Jackson, Black and Frankfurter in dissent insisted that there could be no fraud
here unless the marriages were in fact invalid, and that hence the finding of in-
validity by the district court must be ruled upon.
4. The dissenting Justices read the majority opinion as condoning a departure
from the established rule of spouse's privilege because "the relationship was not
genuine. . .. However . . . the trial court could only conclude that the mar-
riage was a sham from the very testimony whose admissibility is in question. The
Court's position seems to be that privileged testimony may be received to destroy
its own privilege. We think this is not allowable, for the same reason that one can-
not lift himself up by his own bootstraps." Instant case at 491.
5. The doctrine discussed in this comment is the pzilege of one spouse to ex-
clude the adverse testimony of his mate, whether confidential or not. See 8 WIG-
mORp, EVIDENCE § 2227 et seq. (3d ed. 1940). The exclusion of one spouse's testi-
mony on behalf of the other is a disqualification. The main reasons for the disquali-
fication rule are the unity of interest of husband and wife, and the "bias of affection"
which exists between them. See 2 WiGmome, EVIDENCE § 600 et seq. The further
privilege of excluding confidential communications between husband and wife as
evidence is distinct from the testimonial privilege and disqualification doctrines. See
8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2285, 2332 et seq.
6. This probably had its foundation in the crime of "petit treason" of a wife
or servant against the lord of the household. Common law jurists were reluctant
to justify "testimonial treason." See 8 WiG oE, EVIDENCE §2227.
7. 8 WiGMoRE, EviDENCE § 2227.
8. See 2 id., § 488; Note, 38 VA. L. Rav. 359, 362 (1952).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 631 (1946). In addition, a spouse may testify in cases of bigamy,
polygamy, and unlawful cohabitation, 24 STAT. 635 (1887), 28 U.S.C. §633 (1946),
and also in cases involving importation of aliens for immoral purposes. 39 STAT.
878 (1917), 8 U.S.C. § 138 (1946).
10. 290 U.S. 371 (1933), overruling Hendrix v. United States, 219 U.S. 79
(1911) ; Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189 (1920).
11. Yoder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935). See comments: 24
CALIF. L. Rxv. 472 (1936); 35 Micn. L. Rnv. 329 (1936); 20 MiNe. L. Rav. 693
(1936).
12. E.g., United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1949); Brunner v.
United States, 168 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1948) ; Paul v. United States, 79 F.2d 561
(3d Cir. 1935) ; Adams v. United States, 259 Fed. 214 (8th Cir. 1919) ; Fitter
v. United States, 258 Fed. 567 (2d Cir. 1919).
13. See United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1949).
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However, the common law has developed exceptions to the general doc-
trine in cases of "necessity," involving injuries to one spouse by the other,
such as battery, fraud, adultery, and desertion. 4 The federal courts seized
upon this "necessity" exception to allow testimony by spouses not only in
the traditional personal injury situations, but also in cases involving such
crimes as Mann Act violations.15
It is quite possible that the instant case can be explained as a further
extension of the "necessity" exception if the holding is limited to the facts
peculiar to the case, i.e., where the issue is the validity of a marriage in
relation to the statutory qualification for immigration. Certainly there is
no more reliable evidence that a marriage is a hoax than the testimony of
the spouse. 16 But prospectively the case may be significant less for its
holding that for what it implicitly sanctions. Following the Funk deci-
sion, that Court's reasoning that public policy changes required revision of
the common law rules was embodied in Federal Rule 26, which provides
that the competency of witnesses shall be governed by common law prin-
ciples "as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience." 17 The opinion in the present case ap-
pears to sanction a broad application of this phrase.,
Armed with this decision, the lower federal courts may now feel free
to further erode the privilege. From the standpoint that rules of evidence
must be designed to encourage disclosure of the truth, the privilege should
exist only to the extent there is valid justification for it. Since the family
harmony consideration is the only justification, a spouse who is willing to
testify against the other should be permitted to do so. If the spouse is
unwilling, there is a high probability that family harmony exists which
should be protected. Giving the privilege to the testifying spouse would
accomplish the desired result.
14. 8 WiGmoRF, EVIDENCE § 2239.
15. See Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949) ; Hayes v. United
States, 168 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d
Cir.), aff'd onr rehearing, 138 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794
(1944).
16. Two common law cases indicated that an alleged wife might be examined
on the voir dire as to the invalidity of the marriage. Wakefield's Case, 2 Lew.
C.C. 279 (1839); Peat's Case, 2 Lew. C.C. 288 (1893). See also, 8 WIGMORE,
EvmiEN § 2231.
17. FED. R. CR. P. 26.
18. ". . . we are to determine whether 'in the light of reason and experience'
we should interpret the common law so as to make these ostensible wives competent
to testify against their ostensible husbands. The reason for the rule at common law
disqualifying the wife is to protect the sanctity and tranquility of the marital rela-
tionship. . . . It is hollow mockery for the petitioners in arguing for the policy
of the rule to invoke the reason for the rule and to say to us 'the husband and wife
have grown closer together as an emotional, social, and cultural unit' and to speak
of 'the close emotional ties between husband and wife' . . . . In a sham, phony,
empty ceremony such as the parties went through in this case, the reason for the rule
disqualifying a spouse from giving testimony disappears, and with it the rule." Instant
case at 488.
